Racial Anxieties in Adoption: Reflections on \u3cem\u3eAdoptive Couple\u3c/em\u3e, White Parenthood, and Constitutional Challenges to the ICWA by Rolnick, Addie & Pearson, Kim
RACIAL ANXIETIES IN ADOPTION: 
REFLECTIONS ON ADOPTIVE COUPLE, WHITE 
PARENTHOOD, AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHALLENGES TO THE ICWA
Addie Rolnick* & Kim Pearson**
2017 MICH. ST. L. REV. 727
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION............................................................................... 727 
I. DISPLACED CHILDREN............................................................. 733 
II. RACE IN FAMILY LAW ............................................................. 738 
III. WHITENESS AND IDEAL PARENTHOOD.................................... 745 
CONCLUSION.................................................................................. 750
INTRODUCTION
The Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) is under fire; 
challengers argue that it interferes with adoptions and violates the 
Constitution by doing so. The current crop of lawsuits is an 
outgrowth of a 2012 case in which the Supreme Court heard its 
second-ever challenge to the law. While the Court sidestepped the 
most far-reaching anti-ICWA arguments, the majority opinion 
evidenced a deep skepticism about the law. This skepticism led the 
Court to narrow the law’s application so that it didn’t cover the 
family involved, and the decision seemed to invite further challenges 
to the law.
In the case, an unmarried father sought to stop his ex-fiancée 
from terminating his parental rights and allowing their daughter to be 
adopted by an educated, middle class, white couple. The father 
argued that the law applied to his situation because he is an enrolled 
member of the Cherokee Nation.1 A cursory reading of the law’s text 
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** Associate Law Professor, Gonzaga University School of Law. The 
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1. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2558 (2013).
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suggests that he is correct.2 If applied, it would have required 
adherence to stricter procedural requirements than state law would 
have imposed before the adoption could be finalized. 
Under the ICWA, a parent’s rights cannot be involuntarily 
terminated in the absence of notice to the parents and the tribe, 
appointed counsel, a showing that active efforts were made to 
prevent the breakup of an Indian3 family, and a finding that 
continued custody by the parent will harm the child.4 The father in 
this case wanted custody of his daughter, and there was no 
suggestion made at any time that he caused her harm.5 Application of 
the ICWA would not have prohibited the adoption outright, but the 
presence of a stable and loving birth parent who wanted to keep his 
child would have prevented her adoption under the law. This 
outcome makes sense. In the absence of harm, prospective adoptive 
parents are not typically permitted to keep a child, even one they 
love and have cared for, over the objections of one of her birth 
parents. And yet, if the father were not an Indian, state law would 
have allowed his daughter to be given to another family despite his 
2. The law defines “Indian child” as any person under the age of 18 who is 
a member of an Indian tribe or a biological child of a tribal member who is herself 
eligible for membership. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (2012). The father is a Cherokee 
citizen, and his daughter is also eligible for citizenship under Cherokee law. See 
Bethany R. Berger, In the Name of the Child: Race, Gender, and Economics in 
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 67 FLA. L. REV. 295, 329 (2015). The law defines a 
parent as “any biological parent or parents of an Indian child,” but does not include 
an unwed father “where paternity has not been acknowledged or established.” 25 
U.S.C. § 1903(9). No argument was made in this case that the father did not 
acknowledge paternity. See Berger, supra note 2, at 312. When he found out about 
the pregnancy, he asked his fiancée to move up the wedding date. Id. at 301. After 
the breakup, he tried to contact her throughout the pregnancy, and he and his family 
tried to send her gifts and money. Id. at 302. He was named in adoption paperwork, 
and he was asked to sign a form indicating his consent to the adoption before it 
proceeded. See id. at 306. 
3. In this Article, we use the term “Indian” when referring to a legally-
defined class of people, such as those children and families covered by the ICWA. 
When referring more broadly to the history of displacement of Native children, we 
use the terms “Native” and “indigenous” interchangeably.
4. 25 U.S.C. § 1912. Even in cases of voluntary termination, consent is not 
valid under the ICWA unless it is executed in writing before a judge and the judge 
certifies that the terms and consequences were fully explained to the parent. Id. §
1913.
5. See Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2558-59.
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presence and over his objections.6 Because the Court determined that 
the ICWA didn’t apply, this is precisely what happened in the case.7
Why didn’t the Court apply the ICWA?8 One answer is that the 
Court did not seem to believe or value the fact that the father and 
daughter are Cherokee Indians. Resisting the idea that their Cherokee 
status should matter in an adoption decision, it found a way not to 
apply the law that made it matter. In her article “In the Name of the 
Child: Race, Gender, and Economics in Adoptive Couple v. Baby 
Girl,” Bethany R. Berger deftly deconstructs the arguments,9 the 
majority opinion,10 and the back stories of the attorneys11 and the 
Justices12 to reveal the way that anxieties about race and adherence to 
the modern version of colorblindness led the Court to “do violence” 
to the law’s text.13 These racial anxieties ran deep. The very first 
sentence of Justice Alito’s opinion describes the baby as “1.2% 
(3/256) Cherokee.”14 By framing the baby’s connection to the 
Cherokee Nation only in terms of fractional ancestry, Justice Alito 
revealed the Court’s fundamental investment in the idea that race 
(defined by the Court as equivalent to ancestry) is insignificant to 
identity. As Justice Roberts asked during oral argument, is it “one 
drop of blood that triggers all these extraordinary rights?”15
6. See id. at 2559.
7. See id. at 2560.
8. The South Carolina Supreme Court held that the ICWA did apply and 
that no sufficient showing of harm justified involuntary termination of parental 
rights. See id. at 2559.
9. Berger, supra note 2, at 325-27.
10. Id. at 327.
11. Id. at 310-11; see also Andrew Cohen, Indian Affairs, Adoption, and 
Race: The Baby Veronica Case Comes to Washington, ATLANTIC (Apr. 12, 2013), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/04/indian-affairs-adoption-and-
race-the-baby-veronica-case-comes-to-washington/274758/ [https://perma.cc/CZZ7-
M4XW] (describing Paul Clement, the attorney for the guardian ad litem, as seeking 
to “undermine Congressional authority over the ICWA and all federal Indian law” 
and linking his arguments in the Adoptive Couple case to his representation of a non-
Indian gaming client engaged in a legal challenge to Indian gaming rights in 
Massachusetts).
12. Berger, supra note 2, at 330.
13. Id. at 318.
14. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2556 (2013).
15. Berger, supra note 2, at 327. The Court’s skepticism regarding the 
ICWA is also apparent in the opinion’s suggestion that application of the law would 
disadvantage Indian children by making [non-Indian] people reluctant to adopt 
them, Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2564-65; Berger, supra note 2, at 319 
(explaining that this assertion is “implausible”), and its reference to the father’s 
argument as an “ICWA trump card [played] at the eleventh hour,” Adoptive Couple,
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The best (and most often given) response to this is that 
Indianness is not race.16 That is, it’s not reducible to a biological 
classification. Professor Berger makes this point eloquently, pointing 
out that that the ICWA should have applied because of the child’s 
eligibility for citizenship (and the father’s citizenship) in the 
Cherokee Nation. Her “quantum of Cherokee blood was irrelevant to 
her citizenship,”17 and so, contrary to the Court’s repeated insistence, 
her fractional ancestry “was not the reason her father had rights to 
object to her adoption.”18 Indian tribes have a different relationship 
133 S. Ct. at 2565. Its view regarding the insignificance of the father’s Cherokee 
status is made clear by the opinion’s wholesale dismissal of any aspect of the 
father’s Cherokee identity outside of ancestry, see Berger, supra note 2, at 332-33
(detailing the father’s family’s political, cultural, and geographic integration into the 
Cherokee Nation, all ignored by the Court), and in the way the majority opinion fails 
to engage Mississippi Band of Choctaw v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989), the Court’s 
only ICWA precedent and a case that strongly underscored the importance of the 
connection between Indian tribes and their children. The Court’s dismissive 
treatment of the family’s Cherokee status was no doubt fueled by the attitudes of 
others involved in the case. See, e.g., Brief for Respondent Birth Father at 13, 
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013) (No. 12-399), (quoting 
guardian ad litem’s finding that the advantages of “having Native American heritage 
‘include[ed] free lunches and free medical care and that they did have their little get 
togethers and their little dances’”).
16. Berger, supra note 2, at 335. In legal terms, Indianness is a political 
classification that hinges here on citizenship (or eligibility for citizenship) in a 
federally recognized tribe, not a racial classification. Id. In our view, it makes no 
sense to claim, as some do, that Indianness has nothing at all to do with race and 
racism. It is equally a mistake, however, to suggest that the specter of race renders it 
less of a political status in the sense that the term is used to denote a particular legal 
history in which the federal government has treated Indian tribes as separate nations 
and has assumed unique powers to legislate with respect to tribes and indigenous 
people. See Addie C. Rolnick, The Promise of Mancari: Indian Political Rights as 
Racial Remedy, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 958, 1026 (2011). 
17. Berger, supra note 2, at 329. 
18. Id. Unlike many other tribes, the Cherokee Nation does not require 
members to have any specific fraction of ancestry; members must instead 
demonstrate descent from a person on the historical tribal rolls. CONST. OF THE 
CHEROKEE NATION, art. IV. The fact that the Nation does not rely on “blood 
quantum,” a concept that has been criticized for injecting racial requirements into 
tribal citizenship, see, e.g., Kimberly TallBear, DNA, Blood, and Racializing the 
Tribe, 18 WICAZO SA REV. 81, 88-93 (2003) (summarizing critiques), provided little 
comfort to the Court. Instead, the Court seemed to view the Nation’s citizenship law 
as problematic because it extends citizenship to people whom the Court viewed as 
having an insignificant fraction of Cherokee ancestry. See Adoptive Couple, 133 S. 
Ct. at 2565; see also Transcript of Oral Argument, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 
133 S. Ct. 2552 (No. 12-399) (quoting Alito, J.) (inquiring whether Indian status 
under the Act might be open to anyone who could establish a “slight” degree of 
Indian ancestry). For a discussion of the paradox faced by American Indian tribal 
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with the federal government than any other group, a relationship 
based largely on treaties and recognition of nationhood. They are 
recognized as governments and their courts generally exercise 
jurisdiction over family and child welfare matters involving their 
children. That is why the baby’s Cherokee-ness mattered in a way 
that her Hispanic-ness (on her mother’s side) did not.19
While correct, this response has not placated critics. After the 
decision, the Department of the Interior issued new guidelines in 
201520 intended to strengthen the force of the ICWA in state courts. 
Two new lawsuits were immediately filed challenging the 
constitutionality of the ICWA and the guidelines.21 A third was filed 
nations in which they are simultaneously viewed as (illegal) racially exclusive 
communities and as not being sufficiently Indian, see generally Bethany R. Berger, 
Race, Descent, and Tribal Citizenship, 4 CAL. L. REV. CIR. 23 (2013); Matthew L.M. 
Fletcher, Race and American Indian Tribal Nationhood, 11 WYO. L. REV. 295 
(2011).
19. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433-34 (1984) (prohibiting express 
consideration of a step-parent’s non-white race as a dispositive factor in a custody 
dispute between divorced parents). Even though disputes about custody are very 
different from adoption proceedings, courts’ attitudes about race filter through all 
decisions that involve questions about the best interests of children, including 
custody, placement, termination, and adoption. 
20. In 2016, after notice and comment, the Department promulgated new 
regulations to implement the ICWA and issued a revised set of guidelines. See 
Indian Child Welfare Act Proceedings, 81 Fed. Reg. 38,778 (June 14, 2016) (to be 
codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 23); BUREAU OF INDIAN AFF., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR,
GUIDELINES FOR IMPLEMENTING THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT (2016).
21. See generally Class Action Complaint, A.D. v. Washburn, No. 2:15-cv-
01259-DKD (D. Ariz. July 6, 2015). The complaint in A.D. v. Washburn was 
dismissed without prejudice for lack of standing. Order at 19, No. 2:15-cv-01259-
PHX-NVW (D. Ariz. Mar. 16, 2017) (“Any true injury to any child or interested 
adult can be addressed in the state court proceeding itself, based on actual facts 
before the court, not on hypothetical concerns. If any Plaintiffs encounter future real 
harm in their own proceedings, the judge in their own case can discern the rules of 
decision. They do not have standing to have this Court pre-adjudicate for state court 
judges how to rule on facts that may arise and that may be governed by statutes or 
guidelines that this Court may think invalid.”). The plaintiffs have appealed that 
decision. Plaintiff’s Notice of Appeal, A.D., No. 2:15-cv-01259-PHX-NVW; 
Appellant’s Opening Brief, A.D. v. Washburn, No. 17-15839 (9th Cir. Sept. 1, 
2017). The plaintiffs in National Council for Adoption v. Jewell challenged the 2015 
guidelines on administrative and constitutional grounds. 156 F. Supp. 3d 727, 730, 
732 (E.D. Va. 2015). The district court denied plaintiff’s motion for summary 
judgment on the administrative claims and dismissed the constitutional challenges, 
Memorandum Opinion and Order at 10-14, 156 F. Supp. 3d 727, finding that the 
plaintiffs had not identified any authority to support their equal protection claim. 
The plaintiffs appealed, and the Fourth Circuit later vacated the district court’s 
judgment because the Bureau withdrew the 2015 guidelines and replaced them with 
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on the eve of this Article’s completion.22 Where the opinion in 
Adoptive Couple raised questions about Indianness, race, and 
adoption but decided the case on statutory grounds, these lawsuits 
directly attack the ICWA as an unconstitutional race-based law.23
We agree that the Court improperly inserted a discussion of 
race into its consideration of an Indian statute,24 but the subsequent 
suits illustrate the folly in dismissing the Court’s racial anxieties too 
quickly. In this Article, we seek to engage the Court’s fears directly. 
For, although Indians are not identically situated to other racial 
minority groups, the harm that the ICWA was designed to counteract 
was a racial harm in the sense that the work of severing Native 
children from tribal communities was part of an effort to eradicate 
those communities (defined by law and social practice as racially 
inferior) by absorbing them via interracial marriage and cultural 
reprogramming. As Professor Berger explains, the practice of 
removing Indian children from their communities was directly linked 
to both the racialization of Indians and colonial efforts to acquire 
indigenous land and dominate indigenous peoples.25 The ICWA is a 
new ones in December 2016. Order, No. 16-1110 (4th Cir. Jan. 30, 2017). See
BUREAU OF INDIAN AFF., supra note 20, at 6. 
22. See generally Amended Complaint, Brackeen v. Zinke, No. 4:17-cv-
00868 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 15, 2017).
23. See, e.g., Class Action Complaint, supra note 21, ¶ 25. In A.D. v. 
Washburn, the complaint frames the ICWA as unconstitutional because it allegedly 
distinguishes among groups of children because of race: 
Children with Indian ancestry, however, are still living in the era of 
Plessy v. Ferguson. Alone among American children, their adoption and 
foster care placements are determined not in accord with their best 
interests but by their ethnicity, as a result of a well-intentioned but 
profoundly flawed and unconstitutional federal law, the Indian Child 
Welfare Act . . . .
Id. ¶ 3. The National Council for Adoption complaint states, “ICWA violates the due 
process and equal protection rights of ‘Indian children’ as well.” Complaint ¶ 7, 
National Council for Adoption, 156 F. Supp. 3d 727 (No. 1:15-cv-00675-GBL-
MSN). See also Amended Complaint, supra note 22, ¶ 307 (alleging that the 
ICWA’s placement provision “impose[s] a naked preference for ‘Indian families’ 
over families of any other race” and that the law’s “classification of Indians and 
non-Indians, and its discrimination against non-Indians, is based on race and 
ancestry and violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection”).
24. See Berger, supra note 2, at 325; see also Alyosha Goldstein, 
Possessive Investment: Indian Removals and the Affective Entitlements of Whiteness,
66 AM. Q. 1077, 1077 (2014); Aura Bogado, The Cherokee Nation’s Baby Girl Goes 
on Trial, COLORLINES (Apr. 24, 2014, 9:56 AM), http://www.colorlines.com/
articles/cherokee-nations-baby-girl-goes-trial [https://perma.cc/Z4V7-77XS]. 
25. See Berger, supra note 2, at 330-32.
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legal intervention intended to counteract this process. While it is not 
a race-based statute, it seems that the Court’s skepticism of such an 
intervention was race-based, and the new lawsuits seek to mine this 
skepticism. It is this fear that we hope to interrogate: What is so 
terrifying about a law that strongly protects minority families, works 
to ensure that minority children remain in their communities, and
recognizes the rights of communities to control decisions regarding 
the placement of their children?
I. DISPLACED CHILDREN
The Indian Child Welfare Act was a response to a particularly 
chilling history in which generations of Native children were 
removed from their homes and communities. Sometimes removal 
occurred with the express intent of annihilating tribal culture and 
literally handing Native children over to white institutions to be 
remade.26 Such was the goal of federally run boarding schools in the 
late 1800s and early 1900s.27 Native people have stories of children 
being kidnapped from their families and taken far away to a boarding 
school, where they were physically and mentally abused.28 But 
26. Id. at 350-51 (citing COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
§ 1.04 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., 2012)).
27. See generally MARGARET CONNELL SZASZ, EDUCATION AND THE
AMERICAN INDIAN 106 (1999) (discussing educational programs as a vehicle for 
assimilation of Indians); K. TSIANINA LOMAWAIMA, THEY CALLED IT PRAIRIE
LIGHT: THE STORY OF CHILOCCO INDIAN SCHOOL 3, 5 (1994) (relating Indian 
experience of assimilation through boarding school program); see also R.H. Pratt, 
The Advantages of Mingling Indians with Whites, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL 
CONFERENCE OF CHARITIES AND CORRECTION 45, 46 (Isabel C. Barrows ed., 1892) 
(explaining the goal of the boarding schools to “[k]ill the Indian . . . and save the 
man”).
28. See KENNETH LINCOLN, NATIVE AMERICAN RENAISSANCE 21 (1983) 
(referring to stories of kidnapping); Ann Murray Haag, The Indian Boarding School 
Era and Its Continuing Impact on Tribal Families and the Provision of Government 
Services, 43 TULSA L. REV. 149, 153-54 (2007) (detailing a history of government 
boarding schools for Indian children); Maureen Smith, Forever Changed: Boarding 
School Narratives of American Indian Identity in the U.S. and Canada, 2 
INDIGENOUS NATIONS J. 57, 65-67 (2001) (describing incidents of abuse); Gretchen 
Millich, Survivors of Indian Boarding Schools Tell Their Stories, WKAR NEWS,
http://wkar.org/post/survivors-indian-boarding-schools-tell-their-stories [https://
perma.cc/45VW-UC3U] (recounting stories of abuse from various schools) (last 
visited Feb. 22, 2018); Native Americans File Lawsuit Against Boarding School 
Abuses, VOICE AM. (Oct. 30, 2009, 5:58 AM), https://www.voanews.com/a/a-13-a-
2003-08-10-20-native/390462.html [https://perma.cc/K952-NL8A] (describing 
734 Michigan State Law Review 2017
people also tell stories of parents voluntarily sending their children to 
school, and of positive educational experiences at some of the 
schools.29 Like anything else, it is a complicated history that is not 
easily cabined in a voluntary versus forced dichotomy.
This express assimilation campaign was eventually rejected, 
but Native children continued to be removed from tribal 
communities via state child welfare workers, foster care, and 
adoption.30 Removal was no longer animated by a malicious intent to 
annihilate indigenous cultures and undermine group social and 
political cohesion. However, it was still premised on the assumption 
that Native families and, more pointedly, Native communities were 
dysfunctional. By this logic of dysfunction, leaving children in the 
custody of their parents or even their extended families and 
communities would work a harm so severe that child welfare 
intervention was needed. The bar for showing that removal was 
necessary was quite low.31 Children were removed based on vague 
litigants’ claims of physical abuse and neglect in lawsuit against government-
sponsored, church-run boarding schools).
29. See generally, e.g., POLINGAYSI QOYAWAYMA & VADA F. CARLSON, NO
TURNING BACK: A TRUE ACCOUNT OF A HOPI INDIAN GIRL’S STRUGGLE TO BRIDGE 
THE GAP BETWEEN THE WORLD OF HER PEOPLE AND THE WORLD OF THE WHITE MAN
(1964); LOUISE UDALL, ME AND MINE: THE LIFE STORY OF HELEN SEKAQUAPTEWA
(1969); see also LOMAWAIMA, supra note 27, at 25-26 (recounting stories of positive 
experiences despite repressive institutional practices at Chilocco in the 1920s and 
1930s); Native Americans File Lawsuit Against Boarding School Abuses, supra note 
28 (quoting one attendee from the 1940s who “value[d] the religious training I got 
there as well as the academics”). 
30. Berger, supra note 2, at 350 (citing LAURA BRIGGS, SOMEBODY’S
CHILDREN: THE POLITICS OF TRANSRACIAL AND TRANSNATIONAL ADOPTION 7-8
(2012)) (“American Indian children, like African American children, became targets 
for child welfare removals after they began receiving state-financed welfare 
assistance in large numbers.”).
31. Brian D. Gallagher, Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: The 
Congressional Foray into the Adoption Process, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 81, 85 (1994) 
(“Congress was especially critical of the general standards employed by the child 
welfare system in determining the necessity of intervention. One survey cited found 
that ninety-nine percent of the cases involving the removal of Indian children from 
their families were predicated ‘on such vague grounds as “neglect” or “social 
deprivation” and on allegations of the emotional damage the children were subjected 
to by living with their parents.’ Congress was altogether dismayed at the lack of 
understanding non-Indian child welfare workers had of Indian family society.”). 
Systematic removal of Indian children is not only a relic of the past; South Dakota 
child welfare officials were recently found to have adopted procedures facilitating 
easy removal of Indian children from their homes, violating the ICWA and denying 
Indian parents their rights to due process prior to removal. See Oglala Sioux Tribe v. 
Van Hunnik, 100 F. Supp. 3d 749, 754, 773 (D.S.D. 2015) (granting partial 
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allegations of neglect or deprivation with very little evidence to back 
them up except for misunderstandings of tribal cultures, devaluation 
of extended family structures, and racist assumptions about Native 
people.32
Native children are not the only children who have been 
involuntarily removed from their parents and communities at 
disproportionately high rates, nor the only population subjected to 
wholesale transfer out of their communities and into “good” white 
homes. Although various minority groups have experienced the 
removal and/or placement of their children in ways unique to each 
group and historical moment, there are strong thematic ties in the 
discourse surrounding childhood displacement that bear exploring. 
African American and some Latinx children, especially poor 
children, are removed from their homes and placed in foster care at 
higher rates than other children.33 Analyzing the statistics in 
summary judgment); Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Van Hunnik, No. 13-5020-JLV, 2016 
WL 697117, at *1 (D.S.D. Feb. 19, 2016) (denying reconsideration request in 
substantial part). 
32. Gallagher, supra note 31, at 85 n.27 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, 
10 (1978)) (“Indian communities are often shocked to learn that parents they regard 
as excellent caregivers have been judged unfit by non-Indian social workers . . . . 
For example, the dynamics of Indian extended families are largely misunderstood. 
An Indian child may have scores of, perhaps more than a hundred, relatives who are 
counted as close, responsible members of the family. Many social workers, 
untutored in the ways of Indian family life or assuming them to be socially 
irresponsible, consider leaving the child with persons outside the nuclear family as 
neglect and thus as grounds for terminating parental rights. Because in some 
communities the social workers have, in a sense, become a part of the extended 
family, parents will sometimes turn to the welfare department for temporary care of 
their children, failing to realize that their action is perceived quite differently by 
non-Indians.”); see also Margaret Howard, Transracial Adoption: Analysis of the 
Best Interests Standard, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 503, 520 (1984) (describing the 
role of biases and misunderstandings in facilitating removal of Indian children). 
33. DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD
WELFARE 54-55, 224 (2002) (documenting overrepresentation of black children in 
child welfare system, attributing disparity to view of black families as pathological 
and inadequate, and showing destructive effects of child welfare policies on black 
families); Annette R. Appell, “Bad” Mothers and Spanish-Speaking Caregivers, 7 
NEV. L.J. 759, 770-79 (2007) (presenting case study of how linguistic and cultural 
differences can lead to “inappropriate and culturally incompetent child welfare 
interventions” for Spanish-speaking Latino families); Dorothy Roberts, Race and 
Class in the Child Welfare System, FRONTLINE, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/shows/fostercare/caseworker/roberts.html [https://perma.cc/ZQ24-V6S6] 
(last visited Feb. 22, 2018) [hereinafter Roberts, Race and Class] (noting that, once 
a child welfare investigation begins, African American children are placed in foster 
care at nearly twice the rate of whites); see generally CAROL B. STACK, ALL OUR
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conjunction with evidence of case-by-case mishandling and 
mistreatment by child welfare agencies, Dorothy Roberts argues, 
would lead a person to “conclude that [child welfare] is an institution 
designed to monitor, regulate, and punish poor families of color.”34
A generation of adoptees from Korea and China are coming of 
age in their adoptive homes,35 most of them with white families and 
most living in the United States. A younger set of children, those 
who lived through the 2012 Haiti earthquake, may have a similar 
experience in twenty years.36 Like some of the children sent to Indian 
KIN (1974) (arguing that social welfare policies are based on stereotypes of black 
families as dysfunctional and self destructive and challenging those stereotypes by 
documenting kinship and child-rearing networks in a poor black community).
34. Roberts, Race and Class, supra note 33.
35. According to the Korean Ministry of Health and Welfare by 2002, an 
estimated 200,000 Korean children had been placed internationally, most to the U.S. 
Maggie Jones, Why a Generation of Adoptees Is Returning to South Korea, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 14, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/18/magazine/why-a-
generation-of-adoptees-is-returning-to-south-korea.html [https://perma.cc/3X6Y-
3AS4]; see also ELEANA J. KIM, ADOPTED TERRITORY: TRANSNATIONAL KOREAN 
ADOPTION AND THE POLITICS OF BELONGING 25 (2010) (discussing Korean adoptee 
statistics); Alyssa Jeong Perry, These Korean Adoptees Grew Up Like Typical 
American Kids. Then They Learned They Weren’t Citizens., NATION (Aug. 2, 2016), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/these-korean-adoptees-grew-up-like-typical-
american-kids-then-they-learned-they-werent-citizens/ [https://perma.cc/T2KL-
ALEW] (noting Korean adoptees coming of age in the United States); The Evan B. 
Donaldson Adoption Institute estimates that China has placed 70,000 children in 
international adoptions. See SARA DOROW, TRANSNATIONAL ADOPTION: A CULTURAL 
ECONOMY OF RACE, GENDER AND KINSHIP 257 (2006) (discussing Chinese adoptees); 
Kari Huus, All-American, with One Foot in China, NBC NEWS (Mar. 25, 2004, 7:52 
PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/4588066/ns/us_news/t/all-american-one-foot-
china/#.WlkjW0tG2IY [https://perma.cc/TL7K-DTE3]. For an interactive map 
displaying statistics of adoptees by country and year, see Adoption Statistics, U.S. 
Dep’t State, https://adoption.state.gov/about_us/statistics.php [https://perma.cc/
KYC5-CS45] (last visited Feb. 22, 2018).
36. See Ginger Thompson, After Haiti Quake, the Chaos of U.S. Adoptions,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/04/world/americas/
04adoption.html [https://perma.cc/V6MG-A8TH]. Thompson’s article describes the 
issues raised by post-earthquake adoptions out of Haiti to the U.S., citing concerns 
raised by child protection advocates. Id. Thompson notes:
[T]hose ends [placing them in middle class U.S. homes] do not justify 
the means. Rushing children out of familiar environments in a crisis can 
worsen their trauma . . . . Expediting adoptions in countries like Haiti –
where it is not uncommon for people to turn children over to 
orphanages for money – violates children’s rights and leaves them at 
risk of trafficking.
Id. In contrast, adoption advocates expressed concern about temporarily housing 
children in-country, arguing that “attempts to locate the children’s biological 
relatives [would] deny tens of thousands of needy Haitian orphans the opportunity to 
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boarding schools, some of these children were “voluntarily” 
placed—some the children of single mothers with few options, and 
others the children of families facing such a lack of resources that 
they believed their children would be better off raised by strangers in 
another country. 
Unlike Korean and Chinese adoptees, and perhaps even more
than American Indian children,37 African American children are not 
transferred into white families so much as they languish in the 
purgatory of foster care because they are viewed as the least 
desirable in the racial hierarchy of adoption.38 As Roberts explains, 
Most white children who enter the system are permitted to stay with their 
families, avoiding the emotional damage and physical risks of foster care 
be placed in loving homes.” Id. See also KATHRYN JOYCE, THE CHILD CATCHERS:
RESCUE, TRAFFICKING, AND THE NEW GOSPEL OF ADOPTION 3-5 (2013) (detailing the 
media framing of Haiti as “a sort of animal kingdom from which children must be 
rescued, lest . . . ‘they won’t even grow up to be human’”). Joyce’s account of the 
post-disaster Haitian adoptions reveals that the efforts to remove children by foreign 
adoption agencies and Haitian orphanages, citing the children’s best interests, were 
occurring at the same time U.S. government officials made it clear that adult Haitian 
refugees were unwelcome in the United States. See id.
37. Berger, supra note 2, at 332 (“[A]doption of Indian children into non-
Indian homes has a particularly honored and accepted place in American culture . . . 
[and] the notion of easy and beneficial assimilation of Indian children into white 
culture helps fuel the desirability of Indian children as adoptees.”). While Professor 
Berger asserts that Indian children are treated just like white children in terms of 
racial desirability in adoptions, id. at 322, the reality is likely more complicated. 
Foster care data suggests Native American children are over-represented in foster 
care. See infra note 38.
38. Mariagiovanna Baccara et al., Gender and Racial Biases: Evidence 
from Child Adoption 2, 23-24 (CESifo, Working Paper No. 2921, 2010) (showing 
that the group which was least preferred by prospective adoptive parents was 
African American boys). See also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., RECENT 
DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS IN FOSTER CARE, DATA BRIEF 2013-1 (2013) (showing that 
despite a marked decline of 47% of African American children in foster care since 
2002, they still represent more than one-quarter of all children in foster care; after 
2009, Native American children have the highest rates of representation in foster 
care). According to the same report, between 2002 and 2012, all groups experienced 
a decrease in the number of children placed in foster care, but children who 
identified as two or more races experienced an increase. Id. We note that, although 
the report shows a net decrease in the number of foster children overall, this pattern 
also likely reflects a change in demographic categories used to count children in the 
system. Adoptive parents’ racial preferences drive the adoption market domestically 
and internationally. See Kim H. Pearson, Displaced Mothers, Absent & Unnatural 
Fathers: LGBT Transracial Adoption, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 149, 159, 165-67
(2012) (describing the shift away from domestic foster care adoptions towards 
international adoption because of shortages of white adoptive children, making 
children believed to be capable of passing as white preferable).
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placement, while most black children are taken away from theirs. And 
once removed from their homes, black children remain in foster care 
longer, are moved more often, receive fewer services, and are less likely to 
be either returned home or adopted than any other children.39
II. RACE IN FAMILY LAW
Race is uniquely devalued in family law proceedings,40
especially adoptions.41 While many other aspects of a child’s identity 
development may be important factors in whether the law is willing 
to intervene in parenting decisions, custody, or placement, race is a 
third rail. As a comparison, courts attend to a child’s religious 
identity, usually by considering the parents’ religious beliefs and 
traditions,42 even if such attentiveness may violate one of the parent’s 
constitutional rights. Another point of comparison is sexual 
orientation; in some states parents are prohibited from forcing their 
39. Roberts, Race and Class, supra note 33.
40. See generally Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984); Fountaine v. 
Fountaine, 133 N.E.2d 532 (Ill. App. Ct. 1956); Foster v. Waterman, 738 N.W.2d 
662 (Iowa Ct. App. 2007); Ebirim v. Ebirim, 620 N.W.2d 117 (Neb. Ct. App. 2000); 
In re Davis v. Davis, 240 A.D.2d 928 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (representative family 
law proceedings showing how courts measure the value of race, ranging from 
express non-consideration to a view of race that refers to cultural activities and 
proximity to racially diverse populations as sufficiently protective of children’s 
racial identity development). 
41. See generally, e.g., ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, NOBODY’S CHILDREN: 
ABUSE AND NEGLECT, FOSTER DRIFT, AND THE ADOPTION ALTERNATIVE (2000) 
(summarizing federal laws that limit explicit consideration of race in adoption, but 
criticizing what the author views as a tendency in practice to protect minority 
children’s birth families and communities of origin at the expense of the children’s 
best interests); Solangel Maldonado, Race, Culture, and Adoption: Lessons from 
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1 
(2008) (analyzing differences in the legal treatment of racial minority children and 
Native American children, who are covered by the ICWA, in placement 
proceedings).
42. See, e.g., Johns v. Johns, 918 S.W.2d 728, 729-30 (Ark. Ct. App. 1996). 
Father required to take children to religious services during his visitation time. Id. at 
729. Order to take children to mother’s choice of religious services was not a 
violation of father’s free exercise of religion because he had no other plan in place. 
Id. See also Jennifer Ann Drobac, For the Sake of the Children: Court 
Consideration of Religion in Child Custody Cases, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1609, 1611 
(1998) (a survey of over fifty cases showed that courts “consider the religious 
beliefs and practices of parents in determining custody of children”); Ann Laquer 
Estin, Embracing Tradition: Pluralism in American Family Law, 63 MD. L. REV.
540, 541 (2004) (calling for the development of a pluralistic approach to family law 
in response to increasing diversity in religious beliefs). 
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gay children to attend conversion therapy.43 Courts and legislatures 
make the connection between LGBT children’s poor health 
outcomes, including high depression, substance abuse, and suicide 
rates and attempts to change their sexual identity development.44 The 
law is willing to regulate parenting—normally considered a private 
sphere—to protect the child from the harm that will come from 
seeking to change that child’s sexual identity. In contrast, the law 
does not similarly attend to children’s racial identity development, 
assuming that a child’s racial identity is malleable, fungible, and of 
less significance to a child’s innate sense of self than sexual 
orientation.45 This is the case despite having data that suggest some 
transracially adopted children have negative outcomes linked to poor 
racial identity development and severed connections to their 
communities.46
What would it look like for the law to value and protect a 
child’s racial identity? The National Association of Black Social 
Workers (NABSW) proposed legislation in the late 1980s and early 
1990s modeled on the ICWA that would have required states to give 
“due consideration” to a child’s race and established a placement 
preference first for a blood relative and, if that were not available, for 
43. See, e.g., S.B. 1172, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012); Assemb. 3371, 
215th Leg. (N.J. 2012).
44. Tina Susman, Chris Christie Signs N.J. Bill Banning Gay Conversion 
Therapy, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/aug/19/
nation/la-na-nn-chris-christie-gay-conversion-20130819 [https://perma.cc/VYB4-
PAQY].
45. See generally Kim H. Pearson, Legal Solutions for APA Transracial 
Adoptees, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1179 (2013).
46. See Anders Hjern, Frank Lindblad, & Bo Vinnerljung, Suicide, 
Psychiatric Illness, and Social Maladjustment in Intercountry Adoptees in Sweden:
A Cohort Study, 360 LANCET 443 (2002); Nam Soon Huh & William J. Reid, 
Intercountry, Transracial Adoption and Ethnic Identity: A Korean Example, 43 
INT’L SOC. WORK 75, 75 (2000) (qualitative study of transracial adoptees’ 
experiences with race); Sueyoung L. Song, The Relationship Among Culture-
Specific Factors, Pubertal Timing, and Body Image and Eating Disordered 
Symptoms Among Adopted Korean Adolescent Girls, iii (Aug. 2009) (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota) (on file with the author). See also Brief 
for Adult Pre-ICWA Indian Adoptees et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Birth Father 
and The Cherokee Nation at 14, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 
(2013) (No. 12-399) (describing how some adoptive parents hid or denigrated their 
children’s Indian identities and how, for the adoptees, the often-difficult process of 
reconnecting to their tribal communities “affected the self-discovery and fulfillment 
that ordinarily occur naturally for children raised in families and communities with 
particular cultural, social, and spiritual traditions”). 
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a same-race family.47 The proposed law would not have prohibited 
transracial adoption; it would have required state agencies to 
consider race and, like the ICWA, would have required them to 
follow the established placement preferences absent “good cause to 
the contrary.”48 By establishing a legal preference for placement of 
minority children in same-race adoptive homes, the law would have 
forced the child welfare system to acknowledge and attend to the 
importance of racial identity development in children, and it would 
have attached legal value to African American and other minority 
families and communities, the historical devaluation of which has led 
to the breakup of many families. The law never passed at the federal 
level, although at least one state adopted similar legislation.49
We do not intend here to advocate for passage of the NABSW 
bill. The proposed legislation had many flaws,50 and we do not 
47. See NAT’L ASS’N BLACK SOC. WORKERS, PRESERVING AFRICAN
AMERICAN FAMILIES: RESEARCH AND ACTION BEYOND THE RHETORIC 6 (3d ed. 
1991), http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/nabsw.org/resource/collection/0D2D2404-77EB-
49B5-962E-7E6FADBF3D0D/Preserving_African_American_Families.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ULV2-EUTG] (describing and reiterating the 1986 proposal and 
reproducing proposed legislation).
48. See id. The placement preferences approximated those in the ICWA. 
Compare id. (giving preference first to a blood relative and then second to “the same 
racial or ethnic heritage of the child”), with 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (2012) (giving 
preference to a member of the child’s family first, to members of the same Indian 
tribe second, and to other Indian families third). The proposed bill would have 
authorize[d] child-placing agencies to give preference, “in the absence 
of good cause to the contrary” to placing a child with a person or 
persons related by blood to the child, or, if that would be detrimental to 
the child or a relative is not available, a family with the same racial or 
ethnic heritage of the child.
NAT’L ASS’N BLACK SOC. WORKERS, supra note 47, at 6. Indeed, the proposal was 
put forth as a suggested amendment to the Indian Child Welfare Act. Id.
49. See Minority Child Heritage Protection Act, 1983 Minn. Laws §§ 
257.01-257.80, https://www.revisor.mn.gov/laws/?id=278&year=1983&type=0 
[https://perma.cc/2ZZS-47RR]. The MMCHPA was passed in 1983 (before the 
NABSW issued its 1986 position paper and proposed legislation). Minnesota Issues 
Resource Guides: Minnesota Minority Child Heritage Protection Act, MINNESOTA 
LEG. REFERENCE LIBR., https://www.leg.state.mn.us/lrl/guides/guides?issue=
mmchpa [https://perma.cc/EN3L-6TKR] (last visited Feb. 22, 2018). By 1997 the 
law had been amended several times to replace racial considerations with the best 
interests of the child standard to bring the law into compliance with new federal 
laws that prohibited “the use of race or ethnicity as a basis for adoption or foster care 
placement.” See id. Illinois also considered a similar bill. African American Heritage 
Child Welfare Act, H.B. 1913, 91st General Assembly (Ill. 1999-2000).
50. On its face, the proposal had drafting and coverage problems. It 
employed the vague term “minority ethnic heritage” to describe the children it 
would apply to, it failed to set forth guidelines for dealing with mixed-race children, 
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necessarily believe that a bill modeled on the ICWA is workable or 
desirable where the child’s community does not coincide with a 
government entity.51 We want to focus instead on the response: 
Congress passed two separate laws specifically prohibiting states 
from weighing race heavily in placement and adoption decisions. 
The Multi-Ethnic Placement Act52 prohibits states from denying a 
person the right to become a foster or adoptive parent “solely on the 
basis of the race” of the child involved and from “delay[ing] or 
deny[ing] placement” of any child “solely on the basis of . . . race.”53
Although it permits states to “consider [a child’s] cultural, ethnic, or 
racial background,”54 race is singled out as a factor that cannot be 
important enough to sustain a placement decision.55 The Interethnic 
it enshrined a particular version of the interplay between racial and religious identity 
preservation, and it failed to address the issues presented by “consensual” 
international adoptions. NAT’L ASS’N BLACK SOC. WORKERS, supra note 47, at 6.
The proposal’s more fundamental flaw, however, is that it was built around two 
main tools: procedural barriers to removal and placement preferences. Although 
these were the two provisions at issue in Adoptive Couple, they are arguably the 
least important provisions of the ICWA, which also provides for tribal court 
jurisdiction over child welfare matters involving Indian children. 25 U.S.C. § 1911. 
It is the jurisdictional provisions that have had the greatest impact, giving tribal 
communities control over what happens to thousands of Indian children, including 
children for whom removal from home was necessary because of actual or potential 
harm. For a more thoughtful proposal that would raise the standards for removal of 
African American children along with other interventions targeted to the specific 
circumstances of African American children and families, see Jessica Dixon, The 
African-American Child Welfare Act: A Legal Redress for African-American 
Disproportionality in Child Protection Cases, 10 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y
109, 125-30 (2008).
51. Inter-country adoptions, such as the adoption of Haitian children by 
U.S. families, might present a better parallel to American Indian children because 
the Haitian government has a role in decisions regarding removal and placement of 
Haitian children. Similarly, the Hague Convention of 29 May 1993 on Protection of 
Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption (Hague Adoption 
Convention) is a system of central government authorities complying with agreed-
upon guidelines in the protection of children who are removed from home countries 
and placed in Convention-participating countries. The Convention, like the ICWA, 
does not ban adoption; instead, it creates child-centric guidelines as procedural 
protections to value the child’s interests in her connection to her community. 
52. Howard M. Metzenbaum Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994, Pub. L. 
No. 103-382, §§ 551-554 , 108 Stat. 4056 (codified as 42 U.S.C. §§ 5115a, 622), 
repealed in part by Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. Law 104-188, 
110 Stat. 1755 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1996b (2012)). 
53. Id. § 5115a(a)(1)(B).
54. Id. § 5115a(a)(2).
55. The Department of Health and Human Services has reported that state 
agencies sometimes avoid all consideration of a child’s race out of fear of violating 
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Placement Amendments strengthened the MEPA’s prohibitions by 
imposing penalties for violating it.56
By prohibiting placement decisions based on race, the MEPA 
stops state child welfare agencies from assigning legal value to race. 
To the extent that race can be considered, it is viewed as only an 
individualized aspect of personality development, an idea that has 
been conceived thinly, even stereotypically, by courts that do address 
it.57 Like the case law governing the use of race in higher education 
admission standards, the MEPA ensures that race can only be 
considered as a personal quality and, even then, as one of many 
factors.58 At the same time, it prohibits state actors from establishing 
a legal regime that makes it more difficult to break up minority 
families and, if families are disrupted, redirects minority children 
back into their families and communities wherever possible. In other 
words, the MEPA prevents states from making a structural 
intervention to correct for the historical devaluation of minority 
families and communities that led directly to the transfer of so many 
children out of them.59 It also forecloses consideration of the way 
the law. See Ensuring the Best Interests of Children Through Compliance with the 
Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994, as amended, and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, OFF. FOR C.R., ADMIN. FOR CHILD. & FAM. SERVS., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH &
HUM. SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocr/civilrights/resources/
specialtopics/adoption/mepatraingppt.pdf [https://perma.cc/9RUN-7GPS] (last 
visited Feb. 22, 2018); see also Preserving Families of African Ancestry, NAT’L 
ASS’N BLACK SOC. WORKERS (Jan. 10, 2003), 
http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/nabsw.org/resource/collection/0D2D2404-77EB-49B5-
962E-7E6FADBF3D0D/Preserving_Families_of_African_Ancestry.pdf [https://
perma.cc/A6HT-YDBF] (calling for repeal of MEPA and IEPA).
56. Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 
1808(b), 110 Stat. 1755 (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 674). The IEP amendments also 
clarified that the MEPA did not affect the ICWA in any way.
57. See Roberts, Race and Class, supra note 33.
58. See Fisher v. University of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2418 
(2013); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 271 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 
306, 329, 337 (2003).
59. This is also consistent with the cases holding that the goal of undoing 
generalized past racism is not a sufficiently compelling interest to permit use of 
racial classifications in the present. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 
200, 227 (1995); id. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson 
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989) (plurality opinion); id. at 505-06 (majority 
opinion); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289-90, 307-10 (1978). 
See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1767 (1993) 
(explaining that the Court’s rejection of race-conscious remedial measures in 
affirmative action cases “is based on [its] chronic refusal to dismantle the 
institutional protection of benefits for whites”).
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that white race has operated as a clear plus factor in determining 
which families were considered the most ideal adoptive placements 
and how proximity to whiteness has defined a child’s desirability in 
the marketplace of adoption. The problem is not special 
consideration of race; it is that race is the only thing that can’t be 
accorded primary importance, despite its central role in the history of 
child welfare and adoption.
The ICWA is an exception to this rule in that it is a legislative 
regime that changes the procedures governing the breakup of Indian 
families and the removal of Indian children from Indian 
communities.60 It forces state courts to acknowledge a child’s 
Indianness, putting the responsibility on the child welfare system to 
determine whether someone is an “Indian child” and to contact the 
child’s tribe.61 It establishes a preference for tribal control over the 
proceedings by requiring states to transfer jurisdiction to the tribal 
court unless the tribe does not or cannot accept it.62 When the case 
remains in state court, it forces the actors (from caseworkers to 
judges) to carefully justify removal and placement outside the child’s 
community by adding heightened requirements for removal and 
termination63 and establishing a hierarchy of placement preferences.64
60. The ICWA can be justified even under the Court’s narrow approach to 
racial remedies under several theories. The primary approach is that Indian 
classifications are political ones that depend on a person’s relationship to a 
recognized tribe, so Indian classifications are not governed by the law on racial 
classifications. Even acknowledging that Indian legal status often overlaps with 
Indian racial status, tribes have clear membership rules, recognized leadership, and 
federally acknowledged legal institutions that make them uniquely able to exercise 
authority over removal and adoption proceedings. Furthermore, even if the Court 
were to apply strict scrutiny to Indian classifications, the harm that the ICWA was 
meant to counteract was so direct, specific, and well documented that a racial 
classification could permissibly be employed to remedy it. See Carole Goldberg, 
What’s Race Got to Do With It?: The Story of Morton v. Mancari, in RACE LAW
STORIES 237, 238, 257 (Rachel F. Moran & Devon Wayne Carbado eds., 2008); 
Carole Goldberg, American Indians and “Preferential” Treatment, 49 U.C.L.A. L. 
REV. 943, 955-58 (2002); Rolnick, supra note 16, at 995-96 (explaining different 
legal theories for upholding Indian legislation); see also Matthew L.M. Fletcher, 
ICWA and the Commerce Clause, in FACING THE FUTURE: THE INDIAN CHILD 
WELFARE ACT 28-29 (Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Wenona T. Singel & Kathryn E. Fort 
eds., 2009) (arguing that the Indian Commerce Clause provides a constitutional 
basis for the ICWA).
61. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(c) (2012).
62. Id. § 1911(b).
63. Id. §§ 1912, 1913.
64. Id. § 1915 (preference for placement with members of the child’s 
family, members of the child’s tribe, and other Indian families, in that order).
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Most importantly, the ICWA recognizes that the relationship 
between tribe and child is not simply one of personal identity or self-
esteem, but is in fact the key to the continued existence of the tribe, 
which is in turn a fundamental aspect of the child’s “best interests.”65
It bears reiterating that the ICWA’s intervention is structural,66
not substantive. It doesn’t require a particular outcome,67 and none of 
its barriers are absolute. A child can still be removed, and a parent’s 
rights terminated, if there is a showing that the child faces serious 
harm.68 A court can depart from the placement preference for good 
cause.69 Instead, it tilts the process in favor of keeping the child in 
the tribal community to counteract the strong historical devaluation 
of those communities and the corresponding advantage accorded to 
white parents, which resulted in Indian parents (and tribes) losing so 
many children. Indeed, many mainstream child welfare organizations 
65. Id. § 1902. The Court’s only prior ICWA decision, Holyfield,
underscored this aspect of the law by holding that the tribe’s interest (and the child’s 
future interest in its connection to the tribe) could outweigh an Indian parent’s fully 
informed attempt to circumvent its provisions. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians 
v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 49 (1989). The Adoptive Couple opinion ignores this 
aspect of the law, characterizing it as nothing more than a law protecting the 
individual interests of Indian parents. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 
2552, 2561 (2013).
66. Laura Briggs, Why Feminists Should Care About the Baby Veronica 
Case, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Aug. 16, 2013), 
https://indiancountrymedianetwork.com/news/native-news/why-feminists-should-
care-about-the-baby-veronica-case/ [https://perma.cc/CM4L-S53Y] (“ICWA does 
not determine who gets a child. It determines jurisdiction – who gets to decide who 
gets a child . . . ICWA does not provide special ‘racial entitlements’; it treats (some) 
American Indians as having a distinct political status conferred by treaty rights . . . 
[A]ll ICWA does is give birth parents rights that many think they should have 
regardless . . . .”); Rolnick, supra note 16, at 1042-43 (describing the ICWA as a 
structural intervention that “explicitly acknowledges the link between the 
individualized effects of Indian racialization and the political rights of tribal 
governments”).
67. In Holyfield, the Court affirmed exclusive tribal court jurisdiction over a 
voluntary adoption of children domiciled on the reservation in compliance with the 
Act, ordering that the case be transferred to tribal court despite the children’s three-
year placement with the prospective adoptive parents. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 53. 
After review of available options, the tribal court placed the children back in the 
same non-Indian adoptive home that had been chosen by the birth parents, who had 
originally tried to avoid the tribe’s jurisdiction, ordering the adoptive mother to 
maintain contact with the children’s extended family and tribe. Maldonado, supra
note 41, at 17. 
68. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(e)-(f). 
69. Id. § 1915(a)-(b). A child’s tribe can also establish a different order or 
preference. Id. § 1915(c).
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have touted the ICWA as the “gold standard” for child welfare.70 It 
prevents a court from doing precisely what courts did for decades: 
removing a child from her family and community, placing her with a 
white family in another state just because that new family seems 
better, and offering only a cursory justification for the decision. 
III. WHITENESS AND IDEAL PARENTHOOD
Within a year of the Court’s decision in Adoptive Couple, an 
entirely different kind of case involving parents and children thrust 
questions about race and family into the public eye. Jennifer 
Cramblett, one half of a white lesbian couple living in a small town 
in Ohio, sued Midwest Sperm Bank for mistakenly delivering sperm 
from an African American donor resulting in a biracial child.71 The 
case was a breach of contract and wrongful birth action, and it made 
out a claim for damages based not upon the fact that Cramblett and 
her partner do not love their daughter (they do), but upon the loss 
suffered by a family who expects to be all white and then loses that 
status.72 In her complaint, Cramblett alleged that she “must relocate 
to a racially diverse community with good schools.”73 Her complaint 
implied that there is a legal harm that should be remedied for her 
inability to remain near her “all-white community [and] all-white, 
70. See Letter from Nat’l Indian Child Welfare Ass’n, to Elizabeth Appel, 
Indian Affairs, U.S. Dept. of the Interior (May 18, 2015), https://www.nicwa.org/
wp-content/uploads/2016/11/NICWA_Comments_on_ICWA_Regs.pdf [https://
perma.cc/D8HJ-6YYC] (citing briefs and public comments filed by Casey Family 
Programs, Child Welfare League of American, Children’s Defense Fund, Donaldson 
Adoption Institute, North American Council on Adoptable Children, Voice for 
Adoption, and others) (“ICWA has been deemed the ‘gold standard of child welfare 
practice’ by mainstream organizations.”).
71. Complaint for Wrongful Birth and Breach of Warranty, Cramblett v. 
Midwest Sperm Bank, No. 15-L-282 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Sept. 9, 2014).
72. A judge dismissed the wrongful birth and breach of warranty claims in 
September, but gave Cramblett the option to re-file the case as a negligence claim. 
Clifford Ward, Suit Filed over Mix-Up at Downers Grove Sperm Bank Is Dismissed,
CHI7ݒܼݫ୒݆ଽ6HSW30KWWSZZZFKLFDJRWULEXQHFRPVXEXUEV
downers-grove/news/ct-dupage-sperm-bank-suit-met-0904-20150903-story.html
[https://perma.cc/K4V5-SH62]; see also Order at 1, No. 15-L-282 (Ill. App. Ct. June 
27, 2017) (upholding dismissal of amended complaint). Cramblett has since filed a 
negligence complaint in federal court based on substantially the same allegations. 
See generally Complaint for Consumer Fraud, Common Law Fraud, Willful and 
Wanton Misconduct, Common Law Negligence, Breach of Contract, and Breach of 
Warranty, Cramblett v. Midwest Sperm Bank, 230 F. Supp. 3d 865 (N.D. Ill. 2017) 
(No. 16-cv-04553).
73. Complaint for Wrongful Birth, supra note 71, ¶ 27.
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and often unconsciously insensitive family” because of her 
daughter’s “irrepressible” differences.74 In other words, the 
complaint explained that being part of her white community has 
legal value and that having to move to a more “diverse” area would 
entail a quantifiable cost.75 Some of this cost is material: Cramblett 
and her partner moved to the all-white town because its schools are 
better, and they must now send their daughter to potentially worse 
schools because they understand that being the only African 
American child at this “good” school will harm her even more.76
White communities—their schools, their associations, their distance 
from non-white communities—are valuable in this equation. The 
unspoken implication that follows is that non-white communities are 
not. 
These cases may seem to have little in common on the surface: 
One is an adoption case originating with a separated, never-married 
heterosexual couple and an Indian child, while the other is a case 
arising out of an intact lesbian couple’s efforts to start a family using 
artificial reproductive technologies, and a case that does not involve 
Indian children at all. Both cases, however, involve white couples 
seeking to parent through non-traditional methods, and both involve 
non-white children. In each case, a white, upper-middle class, 
educated couple appears to have done everything right in their quest 
to start a family, including making a substantial investment of time 
and money. In our view, access to this particular vision of voluntary, 
resource-intensive family formation provides significant advantages 
to parents. 
In each case, the child’s race is problematized. The difference 
lies in the proposed solution: for the Capobiancos, the adoptive 
family in Adoptive Couple, the preferred solution is to ignore 
differences that they view as only skin-deep, absorb her fully into 
their home, and erase any aspect of her difference. Her birth father’s 
invocation of the ICWA and the legal salience of the baby’s 
Cherokee identity made this difficult. In Cramblett, on the other 
hand, the parents’ preferred solution was to avoid the difficult 
identity and community issues faced by inter-racially adopted and 
racially mixed children by choosing a white donor, a solution 
foreclosed by the bank’s mistake.
74. Id. ¶ 25.
75. Id. ¶¶ 26-27.
76. Id.
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The Cramblett complaint seeks to quantify the value of 
voluntary, upper-middle class, white family formation, but one need 
not even use such a far-flung set of facts to see how such families are 
valued. It is readily apparent in the rich history of removing Korean, 
Chinese, American Indian, Haitian, Latino and African American 
children from their homes and placing them in (or leaving them in 
search of) good white homes.77 It is also apparent in the way the 
potential adoptive parents were described in Adoptive Couple v. 
Baby Girl; media accounts describe them as “ideal” parents, 
emphasizing their educational pedigree and economic status.78 The 
77. See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text. 
78. Addie Rolnick & Kim Pearson, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl Blog 
Series, PRAWFSBLAWG (July 1, 2013), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/
2013/07/adoptive-couple-v-baby-girl-4-of-4-whiteness-and-ideal-parenthood.html 
[https://perma.cc/VTT8-XNZV]; see Robin Abcarian, Legal Battle over Native 
American Girl Comes to a Poignant End, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2013), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/sep/24/local/la-me-ln-legal-battle-baby-veronica-
native-american-20130924 [https://perma.cc/Z4B2-EF74] (“[The child’s birth 
mother’s] adoption attorney found an older, childless couple in Charleston, S.C.,
who wanted to adopt. The couple, Matt and Melanie Capobianco, were present for 
the baby’s birth—Matt cut the umbilical cord.”); Robert Barnes, Baby Veronica’s 
Loved Ones Wait for the Supreme Court to Weigh In, WASH. POST (Apr. 14, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/baby-veronicas-loved-ones-wait-for-the-
supreme-court-to-weigh-in/2013/04/14/7138b5f0-a526-11e2-a8e2-
5b98cb59187f_story.html [https://perma.cc/UTE6-YF4T] (quoting Chief Justice 
Jean Hoefer Toal) (“Adoptive Couple are ideal parents who have exhibited the 
ability to provide a loving family environment for Baby Girl.”); Allyson Bird, 
Broken Home: The Save Veronica Story, CHARLESTON CITY PAPER (Sept. 26, 2012), 
http://www.charlestoncitypaper.com/charleston/broken-home/Content?oid=4185523 
[https://perma.cc/GQF7-JECH] (“‘People try to portray us as these rich people, but I 
was working at an auto body shop at the time,’ says Matt, who now works for 
Boeing. Before this custody case, the couple poured their income into seven 
unsuccessful in vitro fertilization attempts and then the legal and travel expenses of 
finding Veronica’s birth mother, a Mexican woman living in Oklahoma. ‘We 
scraped our money to do the adoption in the first place,’ Melanie says. ‘We saved 
and borrowed for that.’”); Suzette Brewer, Cherokee Nation Mourns as Veronica Is 
Returned to Adoptive Family, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Sept. 24, 2013), 
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2013/09/24/cherokee-nation-mourns-
veronica-returned-adoptive-family-151418 [https://perma.cc/V238-3F7Y] (“Time 
will tell what the ultimate outcome will be for Veronica, who will undoubtedly be 
given the best of what the Capobiancos can afford in terms of education and the 
trappings of an older, upper middle income childless couple.”); Andrew Knapp, 
‘This Can’t Go on Forever’ S.C. Adoptive Couple Faces Delays, Frustration, POST 
& COURIER (Aug. 7, 2013), https://www.postandcourier.com/news/special_reports/
this-can-t-go-on-forever-s-c-adoptive-couple/article_7f070d18-af55-5506-8334-
fbaf8c70d068.html [https://perma.cc/9Z6P-S67F] (human interest story featuring the 
adoptive couple’s home and family life). Accord Cohen, supra note 11 (“Some of 
748 Michigan State Law Review 2017
Court’s opinion emphasizes how they supported mother and baby 
“emotionally and financially” during the pregnancy and how the 
adoptive father “even cut the umbilical cord.”79 The tenor of both the 
opinion and most of the media coverage was one of sympathy for a 
family who had done everything right and yet was facing the loss of 
a child they loved. This narrative ignores the preceding loss faced by 
the father, the tribe, and the baby at the moment she was placed for 
adoption. It ignores the fact that children have attachments to their 
families and communities and in this sense are not free for the 
taking, no matter how deserving the adoptive family.80
In the contest over who could provide a better home for the 
baby, the adoptive couple had a built-in advantage because they were 
white, educated, upper class, and Christian. Historically, this 
advantage has been strong enough to overcome even the presumption 
in favor of biological parents’81 rights to raise their children. Instead 
of counteracting this imbalance, South Carolina82 state law shored up 
the elements of the case, sadly, harken back to the bad old days of dark stereotypes 
about Indians. The adoptive couple, who’ve relentlessly argued their case in the 
court of public opinion by appearing on television with the likes of Anderson 
Cooper and Dr. Phil, have been widely portrayed as the innocent victims of the 
story. Meanwhile, Baby Veronica’s father has been largely portrayed as little more 
than a shifty, good-for-nothing drifter.”).
79. Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2558 (2013).
80. The failure of imagination in modern family law when it comes to 
valuing a birth parent’s rights and a child’s community is stunning, particularly 
when compared to historic family law decisions such as Spence-Chapin Adoption 
Service v. Polk, 274 N.E.2d 431, 431 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1971), which articulated the 
primacy of a birth parent’s rights as compared to would-be adoptive parents: “A 
baby born out-of-wedlock, even of a troubled mother, is not no-one’s child. In the 
inimitable vernacular, it is not ‘up for grabs.’ It is not a waif claimable by the first 
finder, however highly qualified.” Id. Accord Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2572 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“It has been the constant practice of the common law to 
respect the entitlement of those who bring a child into the world to raise that child. 
We do not inquire whether leaving a child with his parents is ‘in the best interest of 
the child.’ It sometimes is not; he would be better off raised by someone else. But 
parents have their rights, no less than children do.”).
81. Kevin Maillard, A Father’s Struggle to Stop His Daughter’s Adoption,
ATLANTIC (July 7, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/07/
paternity-registry/396044/ [https://perma.cc/697C-EK2W] (detailing the challenges 
that unmarried men have in establishing rights to their biological children when the 
biological mother wishes to terminate parental rights and place a child for adoption).
82. As Professor Maillard points out, South Carolina already had a 
reputation for laws favoring adoptive parents. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, South Carolina gained a reputation as an 
“adoption mecca” for wealthy out-of-state couples seeking children. 
The lack of protective laws drew prospective parents who sought quick, 
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the adoptive parents’ advantage (as state child welfare laws have 
historically done) by according the biological father the same status 
as another prospective adoptive parent, erasing the existence of a 
birth parent whose rights could possibly trump even the most ideal 
adoptive home. ICWA’s enhanced procedural protections would 
have tipped the scales back toward balance, but the Court—hiding 
behind its fear of making race significant—neutralized its force by 
holding that it did not apply to the father’s situation.83
In a case with many disturbing angles, this easy erasure of a 
stable, loving birth parent may be the most frightening. The record is 
rife with facts showing at best ineptitude and at worst deliberate 
efforts to circumvent the law.84 As a result, by the time the case 
reached the courts, the baby was two years old and had lived her 
whole life with her adoptive parents.85 Her initial placement with the 
adoptive parents was characterized as completely voluntary (on the 
part of the mother), and the father’s claim to his own child appeared 
as an “eleventh hour” disruption.86 In holding that the ICWA’s 
protections against involuntary termination did not apply to a father 
who had never had custody, the Court drew a line between the 
involuntary removal of Indian children from their families, which the 
law was designed to stem, and an adoption “voluntarily and lawfully 
easy, and uncontested adoptions. An infamous March 1984 Time
magazine article featured a “loving, financially secure college-educated 
couple” that placed a personals ad in a local paper for a “white 
newborn,” promising vacations and expenses paid for an expectant 
mother who wanted to “LIVE LIKE A QUEEN.” The same month that 
the Time article was published, The New York Times found that doctors 
and lawyers privately arranged many adoptions, with little oversight 
from state agencies. Judges often approved adoptions with few 
questions under the assumption that children fared better in adoptive 
homes. At the time, no state law prohibited the open sale of children.
Id.
83. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2555-56.
84. Adoption agency notes show that the mother at first refused to name the 
father because she thought his Cherokee enrollment would complicate the adoption. 
Berger, supra note 2, at 302-03. When the agency finally provided notice to the 
tribe, his name and identifying information were misstated in the letter, leading the 
Nation to respond that they could find no enrollment records. Id. at 303. The mother 
refused contact with the father and his family during the pregnancy and maintained 
strict secrecy during the birth itself. Id. at 304.The father was not notified of the 
planned adoption until several months after the baby had been placed with the 
adoptive family and the adoption petition had been filed. Id.
85. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2554-55.
86. Id. at 2565.
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initiated by a non-Indian parent with sole custodial rights.”87 This 
dichotomy between voluntary and involuntary child welfare 
proceedings is, of course, too simplistic.88 It misses the way that 
racial hierarchies continue to structure ideas about who deserves 
children, influencing even decisions that are nominally voluntary, 
such as private adoptions.89
Policies shaped by values such as stability and permanency in a
loving home are important, but they should not overshadow the value 
a child derives from knowing that her birth relatives want her and 
that she is a member of a community. Over-emphasizing idealized 
homes and stability, especially in cases where children have already 
been placed with foster or adoptive parents, provides cover for 
moving children of color to richer, better-educated white families. 
When the desires of these idealized prospective parents are 
overvalued, adoption can involve a problematic leveraging of 
resources and cultural capital to attain other people’s children.
CONCLUSION
In spite of the unique legal status of tribal communities and the 
presence of a law mandating recognition of that status in child 
welfare and adoption context, some members of the Court in 
Adoptive Couple seemed ready to dismantle, or at least significantly 
limit the reach of, the ICWA because of a concern that it places too 
much emphasis on a child’s ancestry.90 As Professor Berger’s 
analysis of the case demonstrates, dismissing or failing to talk about 
the role of race in adoption is not enough to assuage the Court’s 
fears, and it leaves the field open to opponents of tribal sovereignty.
In this sense, the recent lawsuits challenging the ICWA are 
natural heirs to Adoptive Couple. The first is an action on behalf of 
87. Id. at 2561.
88. Professor Berger describes the “shift toward easy adoption and away 
from rights of biological parents,” including both mothers and fathers, that has 
characterized state child welfare law. Berger, supra note 2, at 343-50.
89. The Court characterized the ICWA as being concerned only with the 
involuntary breakup of intact Indian families via child welfare intervention, 
Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2561, but many pre-ICWA adoptions were also 
voluntary. See Brief for Adult Pre-ICWA Indian Adoptees, supra note 46, at 5-8, 
14-18. 
90. See Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2584 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) 
(“The majority’s repeated, analytically unnecessary references to the fact that Baby 
Girl is 3/256 Cherokee by ancestry do nothing to elucidate its intimation that the 
statute may violate the Equal Protection Clause as applied here.”).
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two adoption organizations,91 one child in foster care, and the birth 
parents of another child.92 One of the attorneys listed on the 
complaint is Lori Alvino McGill, who represented Maldonado in the 
Baby Girl case.93 The second suit is a class action organized by the 
91. The National Council for Adoption is an adoption advocacy 
organization. Mission, NAT’L COUNCIL FOR ADOPTION (2014), 
https://adoptioncouncil.org/who-we-are/mission [https://perma.cc/2QDD-DFXY]. 
Among the “value statements” listed on the NCFA’s website are the belief that 
“[e]thnic and cultural identity, while extremely important considerations, should not 
prevent a child from finding a permanent, nurturing family through adoption” and 
the belief that “[c]ultural and racial identity and birth history are important to 
adopted individuals, and every effort should be made to respect and preserve this 
information so the adopted individual may retain his or her history and heritage.” 
See id. NCFA supported passage of the Multi-Ethnic Placement Act of 1994 and 
legislation designed to facilitate inter-country adoption by granting automatic 
citizenship to babies adopted from outside the United States. Federal Adoption 
Policy, NAT’L COUNCIL FOR ADOPTION (2014), https://adoptioncouncil.org/who-we-
are/mission/Federal-Adoption-Policy [https://perma.cc/A8XX-FAHL]. Building 
Arizona Families is a private, non-profit adoption assistance organization in Arizona 
that is a member of NCFA. International Adoptions, BUILDING ARIZ. FAMILIES,
http://www.bafinternational.com/ [https://perma.cc/6EBL-BQ92] (last visited Feb. 
22, 2018). The company’s website highlights its work facilitating international 
adoptions from China and Haiti. See id. For a more comprehensive look at the 
international adoption industry, particularly adoptions of those “children whose 
parents are poor and live in countries where the social services infrastructure for 
child welfare is limited to orphanages that families may turn to in a season of need,” 
see JOYCE, supra note 36, at xiii.
92. National Council for Adoption v. Jewell, 156 F. Supp. 3d 727 730-31 
(E.D. Va. 2015). See also supra note 21.
93. McGill was also involved in a 2013 challenge to the constitutionality of 
the ICWA filed on behalf of Christina Maldonado, another non-Indian birth mother 
of a Cherokee child, and unnamed “unwed non-Indian birth mothers” of Indian 
children. See Complaint ¶¶ 2, 4, 6, Maldonado v. Holder, No. 2:13-cv-02042-DCN 
(D.S.C. July 24, 2013); see also Michael Overall, New Lawsuit Challenges 
Adoptions Under Indian Child Welfare Act, TULSA WORLD (July 26, 2013), 
http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/local/new-lawsuit-challenges-adoptions-under-
indian-child-welfare-act/article_a93fe281-5d77-5ef2-9df5-fbc638dfccd9.html
[https://perma.cc/3TZL-S7WR]. That lawsuit was voluntarily dismissed in 2014 
after Veronica was placed with the Capobiancos and another plaintiff “decided to 
keep her baby rather than allow the tribe to choose who would raise her child.” See
Samantha Vicent, Baby Veronica’s Birth Mother Dropping Related Lawsuit Against 
Cherokees, U.S., TULSA WORLD (Apr. 9, 2014), http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/
courts/baby-veronica-s-birth-mother-dropping-related-lawsuit-against-
cherokees/article_7a394230-b20f-5d7f-9131-d526646370a6.html [https://perma.cc/
9TVK-Y36L] (quoting McGill). 
McGill also represented the foster parents in a California case in which 
the court ordered a Choctaw foster child removed from her non-Indian foster 
placement, where she had been temporarily placed with the consent of the tribe to 
facilitate reunification efforts, and placed with non-Indian relatives in compliance 
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Goldwater Institute on behalf of two named Indian children in foster 
care in Arizona,94 their prospective non-Indian adoptive parents, and 
“all off-reservation children with Indian ancestry in the State of 
Arizona.”95 The third is an action by non-Indian foster parents 
with the ICWA. See In re Alexandria P., 228 Cal. App. 4th 1322, 1327-28 (2014). 
After unsuccessfully arguing in the lower courts that Adoptive Couple made the law 
inapplicable to the child’s situation, the foster parents sought U.S. Supreme Court 
review of whether the ICWA applies at all to a child who was not being removed 
from an “existing Indian family.” See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, R.P. v. L.A. 
Cty. Dep’t of Children and Family Servs., 137 S. Ct. 713 (2017) (No. 16-500); see 
also R.P. v. L.A. Cty. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 137 S. Ct. 713, 713 
(2017) (denying request for certiorari); Suzette Brewer, ICWA: Supreme Court 
Denies Hearing in Lexi Case, INDIAN COUNTRY MEDIA NETWORK (Jan. 11, 2017), 
https://indiancountrymedianetwork.com/culture/social-issues/icwa-supreme-court-
denies-hearing-lexi-case [https://perma.cc/ZT2P-VHZ9]; Suzette Brewer, ICWA: 
Lexi to Remain with Utah Family in Appeals Court Ruling, INDIAN COUNTRY MEDIA 
NETWORK (July 9, 2016), https://indiancountrymedianetwork.com/news/native-
news/icwa-lexi-to-remain-with-utah-family-in-appeals-court-ruling/ [https://
perma.cc/W6AA-KYT5] (describing the California litigation); see also Richard 
Prince, “Everything Was Wrong” in Coverage of Indian Child Custody Case,
JOURNAL-ISMS (Mar. 26, 2016, 3:15 AM), http://journal-
isms.com/2016/03/everything-wrong-in-coverage-of-indian-child-custody-case/
[https://perma.cc/B9LF-2A29] (describing inaccurate media coverage that strongly 
sympathized with the foster parents). 
94. The named children are both younger than five years old. Although 
seeking certification on behalf of all Indian children in the Arizona child welfare 
system, the complaint specifically alleges that the named children are each “more 
than 50%” non-Indian blood. Class Action Complaint, supra note 21, ¶¶ 9-10.
95. Id. ¶ 11. See supra note 21. The Goldwater Institute has developed a 
website to support its ICWA litigation, which refers to the law as “a well-intentioned 
but a profoundly flawed and unconstitutional federal law” and includes several 
policy reports supporting its campaign against the law. See Clint Bolick, A.D. v. 
Washburn, GOLDWATER INST. (July 6, 2015), http://goldwaterinstitute.org/en/work/
topics/constitutional-rights/equal-protection/case/equal-protection-for-indian-
children/ [https://perma.cc/4NHH-D5D3]. The Institute has also filed a petition for 
certiorari asking the Supreme Court to limit application of the ICWA in cases 
involving children whose “only relationship to [a] tribe is genetic,” citing the “equal 
protection concerns” mentioned in Adoptive Couple, Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
at 22-23, Renteria v. Superior Court of Tulare Count, No. 17-789 (U.S. 2017), cert. 
denied, (Feb. 20, 2018), and has filed amicus briefs in several other cases 
challenging the application of the ICWA and other laws affecting tribal courts as
part its “Equal Protection for Indian Children project . . . devoted to reforming the 
federal and state legal treatment of Native American children subject to the Indian 
Child Welfare Act.” See, e.g., Brief for the Goldwater Institute as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner at 1, Tavares v. Whitehouse, No 17-429 (U.S. Sept. 22, 2017). 
See also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, S.S. v. Colorado River Indian Tribes, No. 
17-95 (U.S. July 17, 2017), cert. denied, (Oct. 30, 2017). 
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seeking to adopt an Indian foster child who was placed with them.96
Other lawsuits challenge the constitutionality of various state laws 
that parallel the ICWA: two suits by biological parents of Indian 
children who want to place their children with non-Indian parents 
through private adoption agencies97 and a third suit by non-Indian 
foster parents seeking to adopt Indian foster children.98 Courts have 
repeatedly and correctly rejected arguments that the ICWA violates 
the constitution,99 but the challenges continue.
The new lawsuits100 lay bare the parallels between efforts to 
pass the MEPA and the IEP and efforts to overturn the ICWA. The 
96. See generally Amended Complaint, supra note 22. According to the 
complaint, the child’s birth parents and grandmother support the adoption. Id. ¶ 1.
97. See Doe v. Piper, No. 15-2639, 2017 WL 3381820, at *1 (D. Minn. 
Aug. 4, 2017) (dismissing action challenging Minnesota Indian Family Preservation 
Act as moot without addressing constitutional arguments); Complaint ¶ 1, Doe v. 
Hunter, No. 15-cv-00471-JED-FHM (N.D. Okla. Aug. 19, 2015), modifying parties 
and dismissing as moot Order, No. 15-CV-471 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 31, 2017)
(challenging the Oklahoma Indian Child Welfare Act). 
98. Complaint ¶¶ 5, 39, 75, Donn ex rel. C.E.S. v. Nelson, No. 1:15-cv-982-
JTN-ESC (W.D. Mich. Sept. 29, 2015), dismissed per stipulation, Stipulation of 
Voluntary Dismissal, Donn, No. 1:15-cv-982 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 27, 2016).
99. See supra notes 21 (describing two federal cases), 93 (describing the 
Alexandria P. case), and 95 (citing to the Colorado River Indian Tribes denial of 
certiorari). 
100. It is worth noting that none of the children named in the first two ICWA 
lawsuits were removed from their homes because of allegations of physical or sexual 
abuse by their parents. The A.D. and National Council for Adoption complaints 
describe voluntary adoptive placements, maternal exposure to controlled substances, 
felony conviction of a child’s mother, incarceration of a child’s father, and 
accidental injury of a child who was left in the care of a relative while his mother 
was at work, with the mother unable to provide 24-hour nursing care required as a 
result of the injury. See Class Action Complaint, supra note 21, ¶¶ 17, 21; see also 
Complaint, supra note 23, ¶¶ 20, 21-22, 32, National Council for Adoption v. 
Jewell, No. 1:15-cv-6756BL-MSN (E.D. Va. May 27, 2015). The complaint in 
Brackeen does not describe the child’s history or the reason for removal. See 
generally Amended Complaint, supra note 22. The children in Donn were in foster 
care because of allegations of substance abuse, mental illness, and neglect by their 
biological mother. See Complaint, supra note 98, ¶¶ 23, 27-28. Their father had a 
history of domestic violence and possible sexual abuse, but the complaint suggests 
they were in the custody of their mother, and that her victimization may have 
contributed to her inability to care for them. Id. ¶¶ 23, 35. Without commenting on 
the specifics of any case, these are all circumstances where additional resources 
provided to the child’s family or community could potentially have obviated the 
need for removal. For a related discussion in the context of international adoption, 
see JOYCE, supra note 36, at xiii (noting that “in an overwhelming number of cases 
children were relinquished because of poverty alone, when a fraction of the huge 
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lawsuits characterize ICWA and related state laws as impeding 
(white) parents’ access to Native children in the same way that 
informal race101 matching policies did before the MEPA and the IEP 
tilted the scales in favor of parental access and reintroduced a 
language of neutrality that prevented full consideration of children’s 
best interests. The ICWA’s opponents see it as another instance of 
race matching that must be defeated. At least one court has correctly 
dismissed this argument, pointing out that the ICWA applies based 
on a child’s citizenship status, not her biological ties, but the lawsuits 
are ongoing.102
The law is clearly constitutional, but sound legal arguments 
have not dissuaded critics’ racial anxieties. In Adoptive Couple, the 
Court left a crack of doubt, and scores of litigants have stepped in to 
pry the crack open.103 Laws that protect Native children are 
doctrinally distinguishable from proposed laws to protect other 
children of color. But, because both challenge the baseline 
assumptions about ideal parenthood and access to children that have 
shaped adoption policy, resistance to the ICWA is driven by the 
same investments that supported enactment of the MEPA and the 
IEP.
sums adopting parents were paying to agencies could have brought birth families out 
of poverty many times over”).
101. Fountaine v. Fountaine, 9 Ill. App. 2d. 482, 484 (Ill. App. Ct. 1956) 
(citing plaintiff’s response to petition for custody) (“[T]he two children have ‘the 
outstanding basic racial characteristics of the Negro race and that for raical and 
religious reasons these children will make a better adjustment to life if allowed to 
remain identified, reared and educated with the group and basic stock of the 
plaintiff, their father.’”).
102. Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 21, at 10-14 (district court 
dismissal of equal protection claims).
103. In order to monitor and coordinate responses to the onslaught of cases, 
several Native rights and child welfare organizations have formed a coalition called 
the ICWA Defense Project. See ICWA Appellate Project, TURTLE TALK,
https://turtletalk.wordpress.com/fort/icwa/ [https://perma.cc/AGY2-QVKM] (last 
visited Feb. 22, 2018).
